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Right to Counsel for DUI in Nevada: A
New Song for Gideon's Trumpet
Nevada has become MADD. 1 Increased public attention has been
drawn to the problem of driving while under the influence of intoxi-
cants. The Nevada Legislature has developed stringent penalties for all
convictions for driving under the influence in an attempt to deter this
activity.' The major mechanism used to implement the legislative in-
tent to deter drunk driving is the mandatory imposition of imprison-
ment for a second conviction3 or, in specified circumstances, a felony
conviction.4
Generally, the first conviction for driving under the influence results
in a minimum fine of $100 and possible imprisonment for up to six
months.5 A second conviction within five years, after having been con-
victed in any jurisdiction,6 results in mandatory imprisonment for not
less than 10 days nor more than six months and a fine of not less than
$500.7 Any subsequent conviction within five years results in imprison-
ment in the state prison for not less than one year nor more than six
years and results in a minimum fine of $2,000.8 The intent of the Ne-
vada Legislature to deter drunk driving, therefore, is demonstrated best
by the imposition of mandatory sentences of imprisonment.9 The ulti-
mate concern of this comment is whether the procedures used by the
1. Acronym for the organization Mothers Against Drunk Drivers.
2. See N.R.S. §484.379.
3. See Nevada Revised Statutes Section 484.379(4) which provides in part:
Any person who violates the provisions of subsection I or 2 within 5 years after having
once been convicted in any jurisdiction of a violation of subsection I or 2, NRS 484.3795
or a law which prohibits the same conduct is guilty of a misdemeanor. . . . the court
shall sentence him to imprisonment for not less than 10 days nor more than 6 months in
the county jail, fine him not less than $500 and direct the department of motor vehicles to
suspend his driver's license for a period specified in the order which must be not less
than 6 months.
4. See Nevada Revised Statutes Section 484.379(5) which provides in part:
any person who violates the provisions of subsection 1 or 2 within 5 years after having
been convicted more than once in any jurisdiction... shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the state prison for not less than 1 year nor more than 6 years and must be
further punished by a fine of not less than $2,000 nor more than $5,000.
5. See N.R.S. §484.379(3).
6. See notes 160-176 and accompanying text infra (discussion of the propriety of using prior
convictions from other jurisdictions for the purpose of enhancement).
7. See N.R.S. §484.379(4).
8. See N.R.S. §484.379(5).
9. The Legislature also has demonstrated the seriousness it attaches to deterring drunk driv-
ing by restricting a prosecuting attorney from dismissing a charge under Section 484.3795 of the
Nevada Revised Statutes in exchange for a favorable plea to a lesser charge. See N.R.S.
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misdemeanor courts to ascertain the existence of a valid waiver of the
right to counsel are sufficient to enable the courts to enforce the legisla-
tively enacted penalties. The problem is significant because prior un-
counseled convictions cannot be used for enhancement purposes unless
they are valid under the sixth amendment. 0
Overriding the legislative mandate of imposing imprisonment is the
pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court that "incarcera-
tion [is] so severe a sanction that it should not be imposed. . . unless
an indigent defendant [has] been offered appointed counsel to assist in
his defense."" Because imprisonment is the result of convictions for
driving under the influence, the procedures used by the Nevada courts,
when a defendant is permitted to proceedpro se, must be analyzed to
determine whether the original conviction is in conformance with the
right to counsel as guaranteed by the United States 12 and Nevada
constitutions. 13
The purpose of the comment is to analyze the procedural deficiencies
that may exist, which could foreclose the use of prior uncounseled con-
victions to enhance the penalties, and will, therefore, have the effect of
denying Nevada courts the power to impose imprisonment. The denial
of the power to imprison would frustrate realization of the goal of the
legislature to deter drunk driving by removing the major enforcement
mechanism in the statute. A discussion of the right to counsel under
federal law and under Nevada, will precede an analysis of the proce-
dural deficiencies that may exist within the Nevada misdemeanor court
systems, namely the municipal courts, as they pertain to safeguarding
an accused's right to counsel. The major emphasis will be on the exist-
ence of a valid waiver of the right to counsel when a defendant at-
tempts to proceedpro se or enters an uncounseled plea of guilty or nolo
contendere. Incident to this discussion is the question of the burden on
the state to make the required showing of a waiver before the waiver
can be accepted by a reviewing court.
Finally, present proposals will be discussed and specific procedures
will be suggested that will aid the courts in developing procedures per-
taining to the right to counsel in misdemeanor courts. The adoption of
these procedures should result in a fair proceeding for those accused of
driving under the influence and ensure the propriety of prior uncoun-
seled convictions. Before determining deficiencies in Nevada proce-
484.3795(2). A prosecutor can dismiss or lower the charge only if he knows "the charge is not
supported by probable cause or cannot be proved at the time of trial." Id.
10. Baldasar v. Illinois, 226 U.S. 222 (1980). See notes 131-133 and accompanying text infra.
11. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1979).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. NEv. CONST. art. I, §8.
1158
1982 / Right to Counsel
dures, it is important first to understand the basis of the right to counsel
as developed and applied to misdemeants.
MISDEMEANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: BACKGROUND
The sixth amendment has been acknowledged to represent rights so
fundamental it has been made obligatory on the states by the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment."4 The primary concern of the
courts is best expressed in the oft quoted opinion in Powell v.
Alabama:15
The right to be heard would be, in many courts, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelli-
gent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally of
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel
he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he has a perfect one. He requires
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.
16
The right to counsel developed around the basic concept verbalized
in Powell, that is, the assistance of counsel may be a necessary element
of a fair trial and has been applied to an expanding array of judicial
proceedings. Initially the right to counsel was limited by the fact that
Powell was a capital case."7 Six years later the right was extended to
encompass allfederal felony cases;"8 but the right was expressly deter-mined inapplicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.' 9
Finally, in Gideon v. Wainwright,2° the Court overruled earlier cases
and held that the right to counsel, as embodied in the sixth amendment,
was applicable to the states.2
The sixth amendment provides that the right to counsel shall attach
"in all criminal prosecutions,"22 but the literal meaning of this phrase
14. See Gideon v. Wainright, 371 U.S. 335, 340 (1963).
15. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
16. Id. at 68-69.
17. See id. at 48.
18. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
19. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942).
20. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
21. Id. at 340.
22. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI (emphasis added).
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has not been accepted as the definitive analysis of the right to counsel,
as evidenced by the slow development of the right to counsel, even in
felony trials. The states were not required to extend the right to coun-
sel to accused felons until 1963-ninety-five years after the adoption of
the fourteenth amendment-when the Court in Gideon concluded that
the sixth amendment is fundamental and essential to a fair trial.23 The
following discussion illustrates that the evolution of the right to counsel
as it pertains to misdemeants parallels the slow federal development of
the right. The nature and requirements of a valid waiver will then be
considered, succeeded by an analysis of the right to counsel as devel-
oped by the Nevada courts.
A. Misdemeant's Right to Counsel
Historically, the development of the right to counsel has been similar
in rationale to the right to trial by jury, i.e., generally limited to serious
crimes.24 Not until 1972, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,2" did the Court first
address any issue pertaining to the right to counsel for misdemeanor
trials. The defendant inArgersinger was an indigent charged with car-
rying a concealed weapon. The offense was punishable by imprison-
ment for up to six months and a $1,000 fine. Argersinger, however, was
sentenced only to serve ninety days in jail.26
The potential punishment was the standard accepted by the Florida
Supreme Court27 for determining whether a misdemeant was entitled
to the assistance of counsel. The court based affirmance of the defend-
ant's uncounseled conviction by analogizing to Duncan v. Louisiana,2"
wherein the Supreme Court held that the right to trial by jury attaches
only for non-petty offenses punishable by more than six months impris-
onment.2 9 In Argersinger the United States Supreme Court refused to
adopt this standard and stated:
While there is historical support for limiting the "deep commitment"
to trial by jury to "serious crimes", there is no such support for a
similar limitation on the right to assistance of counsel...
We reject, therefore, the premise that since prosecutions for crimes
punishable by imprisonment for less than six months may be tried
23. See 372 U.S. at 342.
24. See generally Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968); Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of
Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REV. 917, 980-82 (1926).
25. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
26. See id. at 26.
27. 236 So. 2d 442, 443 (1970).
28. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
29. See id. at 159.
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without a jury, they may also be tried without a lawyer.
30
The Court in Argersinger addressed the issue of whether the right to
counsel attaches to prosecutions for misdemeanor offenses, but the
Court did not delineate the exact limitations of the right.31 The Court
emphasized the importance of the assistance of counsel when a loss of
liberty is involved32 and noted that "[t]he assistance of counsel is often
a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial. '33 The Court, however,
drew the line not at whether due process demands the right, but rather,
at whether the person is actually imprisoned. 34  Given the recognition
of the importance of the assistance of counsel, this limitation by the
Court has been criticized as being doctrinally inconsistent.
This criticism is leveled at Argersinger because the limitations im-
pliedly imposed ignore the basic constitutional value embodied in the
right to counsel, namely, the interest of fairness guaranteed by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 36 The line drawn by the
Court has resulted in the view that Argersinger is merely a sentencing
restriction.37 By avoiding the imposition of imprisonment, a state
would be permitted to use uncounseled convictions. The Court, in ef-
fect, determined that anything less than actual imprisonment did not
warrant constitutional protection. This distinction is a limitation on
the due process clause and results in inconsistency in analysis between
the right to counsel generally and a misdemeant's right to counsel.
Although doctrinal criticism may be well founded, the importance
that social costs play in expanding the right to counsel must be ac-
knowledged. 38  Hindsight, therefore, would suggest the decision in
Argersinger did not unduly burden the states by extending the right too
far too fast.39 By refusing to identify the parameters of the right, the
Court deferred developing the nuances of the right. Subsequent judi-
cial evaluation would be required to resolve the exact limits on ihe mis-
demeant's right to counsel. The Court eventually reinforced the
30. 407 U.S. at 30-31 (footnote omitted).
31. See id. at 37. The Court reasoned that since Argersinger was actually imprisoned they
did not need to address the issue of whether the right attaches to those proceedings in which loss
of liberty is not involved. Id.
32. See id. at 31-37.
33. Id. at 31.
34. Id. at 37.
35. Seegenerally L. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MISDEMEANOR COURT 11-30,32-
35, 33-84 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HERMAN]; Note, Argersinger v. Hamlin andthe Collateral Use
of Prior Misdemeanor Convictions ofIndgents Unrepresented by Counsel at Trial, 35 OHIO ST. L.J.
168 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Collateral Use].
36. Herman & Thompson, Scott v. Illinois andthe Right to Counsel- A Decision in Search of a
Doctrine?, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 71, 77 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Herman & Thompson]; see
Collateral Use, supra note 35, at 173.
37. See Herman & Thompson, supra note 36, at 77.
38. See Herman & Thompson, supra note 36, at 77.
39. See Herman & Thompson, supra note 36, at 77.
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"actual imprisonment" standard in Scott v. Illinois.4"
In Scott, Ambrey Scott was found guilty of shoplifting, punishable
by up to a year imprisonment, and fined fifty dollars.4" Because of the
"potential imprisonment" involved, Scott argued that the right to coun-
sel should attach to any offense punishable by imprisonment.4 2 Adop-
tion of this standard would avoid the predeterminative effect of the
holding in Argersinger and parallel more closely the constitutional
value embodied in the right to counsel.43 The Court, however, rejected
this analysis and expressly limited the right to "actual imprisonment." 44
The right to counsel attaches under the Nevada drunk driving statute
(hereinafter referred to as DUI statute) because of the mandatory terms
of imprisonment, 5 the event that is the threshold inquiry as delineated
in Scott and Argersinger. The Court in Argersinger stated that:
Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know when the
trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed,
even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by
counsel.46
The court also held "that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial."' If the state desires to impose the
authorized penalties of the DUI statute on an uncounseled defendant
by enhancing the penalties, then the state must determine what stan-
dards must be used to ascertain the existence of a "knowing and intelli-
gent" waiver as required by the Court in Argersinger.
B. "Knowing and Intelligent" Waiver
A waiver most often has been defined as "an intelligent relinquish-
ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' 48 This formula-
tion by the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst49 has resulted in three
requirements for a valid waiver. The waiver must be voluntary, know-
ing and intelligent.5" These requirements are present even in situations,
40. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
41. See Herman & Thompson, supra note 36, at 82-85.
42. See Herman & Thompson, supra note 36, at 83.
43. See Herman & Thompson, supra note 36, at 80-81.
44. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 368 (1979). The Court read Argersinger to mean actual
imprisonment is the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel. d. The
Court understood that 4rger~snger held actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from
fines and the threat of imprisonment. Id.
45. See notes 3-9 and accompanying text su.pra.
46. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
47. Id. at 40.
48. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937).
49. 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
50. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1969). The Supreme Court stated:
1162
1982 / Right to Counsel
to be discussed later, in which an accused asserts his independent right
to self-representation.
The requirement that a waiver be voluntary is explained best by
merely stating that the defendant must make the waiver of his own free
will.5 1 The more difficult problem surrounds the determination of
whether there was a knowing and intelligent act. The knowing and
intelligent requirements reflect an initial concern that the accused have
sufficient mental competence 2 to understand the situation and the
questions asked him on the subject of his waiver.5 3 The ultimate con-
cern, therefore, is with the accused's awareness of the consequences of
his decision to waive his right to counsel.5 4 The importance of deter-mining the defendant's awareness has resulted in the common state-
ment that a waiver does not, nor could not, depend on a request for
counsel.55 Before there can be a waiver the record must show that the
defendant was offered counsel and that the refusal of the assistance of
counsel was made with understanding and intelligence.56 "Anything
less is not waiver."' 57 In addition to these requirements, courts are con-
cerned with how well-informed the defendant must be.
In Von Molike v. Gillies 5 the Supreme Court outlined specific re-
quirements that had to be found before the waiver could be accepted.
The Court required that the defendant know:
[T]he nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within
them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible de-
fenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all
facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.59
The requirement that the accused know all of the included offenses,
as well as the other factors required by the Von Moltke Court, has not
been accepted by all federal circuits.6" Thus, the plurality decision in
Von Mo/ike has not been followed; but instead, most courts have only
required that the defendant understand the benefits of counsel and the
"[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent
acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Id.
51. See S. KatNTz, C. SmTrH, P. FRoYD, D. ROSSMAN, & J. HOFFMAN, RIGHT TO COUNSEL
iN CRiMINAL CASES 106-07 (1976) [hereinafter cited as KRANTz].
52. See KRANrZ, supra note 51, at 107.
53. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 249 Ark. 653, 661-64, 460 S.W.2d 319, 323-25 (1970); Cox v.
State, 240 Ark. 911, 405 S.W.2d 937 (1966); People v. Teron, 23 Cal. 3d 103, 113, 588 P.2d 773,
778, 151 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638 (1979) (citing Curry v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 221, 226, 141
Cal. Rptr. 884, 887 (1977)).
54. See KRANz, supra note 51, at 107.
55. See Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962).
56. See id. at 516.
57. Id.
58. 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
59. Id. at 724.
60. See, eg., Spanbauer v. Burke, 374 F.2d 67, 71-74 (7th Cir. 1966); Collins v. United States,
206 F.2d 918, 922 (8th Cir. 1953).
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disadvantages ofpro se representation.61
To determine whether the defendant fully understands the conse-
quences of his refusal of the assistance of counsel, the trial judge must
consider the facts and circumstances of each case; 6z furthermore, the
judge is imposed with a heavy responsibility in making these determi-
nations.63 The Supreme Court has dictated that the right to counsel is
of such importance "that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be
lost, justice will not 'still be done.' "64 As a result, an improper deter-
mination of a waiver will result in a jurisdictional bar to a valid
conviction.65
The importance of a constitutional right makes a waiver of that right
more significant, and therefore, a judge should not take the acceptance
of a waiver lightly.66 The Court should indulge in every reasonable
presumption against waiver.67 The determination of a waiver is of spe-
cial importance, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's ruling that
the right to proceedpro se has a constitutional basis.
68
In Faretta v. California,69 the Supreme Court described the sixth
amendment right to counsel as contemplating not merely the right to
the assistance of counsel, but also as granting to the accused the per-
sonal right to make his defense.7" Anthony Farretta's original request
to be permitted to represent himself was granted, subject to a later re-
versal, if it appeared Faretta was "unable to adequately represent him-
self."71 The judge accepted his request based on the fact that Faretta
had once before represented himself, had a high school education, 2
and was made aware of the possible "mistake" he was making. 73 Sev-
eral weeks later, following a colloquy on Faretta's knowledge of techni-
cal legal procedures and principles, 74 the judge determined that Faretta
61. See KRANTZ, supra note 51, at 107-09.
62. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
63. See United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 186 (9th Cir. 1973). The court held the
district court could not accept a waiver without addressing the accused personally and determin-
ing on the record whether the defendant's decision to proceedpro se was competent and intelli-
gently made with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the penalties involved. Id; see
also Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1, 3 (1972) (waiver will not lightly be presumed).
64. 304 U.S. at 462 (footnote omitted).
65. Id. at 468.
66. See generally Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S,
155 (1957).
67. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 70 (1942).
68. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
69. 442 U.S. 806 (1975).
70. Id. at 819.
71. Id. at 808.
72. See id. at 807-08.
73. See id. The judge informed Faretta that he would be expected to conduct a trial as any
competent lawyer and he would be given no special favors. Id. at 808 n.2.
74. See id. at 808 n.3.
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had not made a knowing and intelligent waiver.75 The Supreme Court
reversed stating that the accused's technical legal knowledge is not rele-
vant to an assessment of whether he has exercised a knowing and intel-
ligent waiver7" and held that forcing an accused to accept counsel
against his will, "deprived him of his constitutional right to conduct his
own defense."77
If the holding that counsel cannot be forced on an unwilling defend-
ant is viewed in isolation, as being independent of any reference to the
recognized ability of a defendant to waive his right to counsel, this ra-
tionale would appear to limit the discretion of the trial court in denying
a defendant's right to proceedpro se.7" This view, however, ignores the
basic premise of the right to counsel as expressed in Faretta.
The issue confronted in Faretta was whether counsel could be forced
on an unwilling defendant;7 9 but, this right was not created in isolation
of the expressed restriction that the accused must "knowingly and intel-
ligently" forego the benefits of having the assistance of counsel.s0 The
conclusion must be reached that while recognizing that the right to
proceedpro se has a constitutional basis, this does not limit the discre-
tion of the trial court because of the necessity of finding a proper
waiver. The importance of the right to counsel as ensuring fairness in
the judicial system cannot be ignored.8 Thus, a trial judge must be
primarily concerned with the existence of a knowing and intelligent
waiver. Only after this determination may a defendant be allowed to
proceedpro se.
82
In light of the right to proceedpro se and the possibility of reversal
for unduly imposing counsel on an unwilling defendant,8 3 the trial
judge must carefully scrutinize the accused's purported waiver within
the guidelines established by Johnson and Von Moltke. These stan-
dards require the defendant's decision be made with an adequate level
75. See id. at 809-10.
76. See id. at 836.
77. Id.
78. See Note, Farela v. California: A Dissenters Point of View, [1976] DET. C.L. REv. 337,
355-57.
79. 442 U.S. at 807.
80. Id. at 835 (citing Zerbst and Von Mo/tke).
81. The Faretta court could have been justified in holding that the right to counsel is too
fundamental to the fairness of a criminal proceeding. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63
(1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); see also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24,
34-35 (1965); Comment, Faretta v. Calfiornia: An Examination of Its Procedural Defciencies, 7
CoLUM. HuM. Rrs. L. REv. 553, 555-56 (1975). The importance of the possible conflict between
the sixth amendment right to counsel and the fifth amendment due process clause should be rec-
ognized. See Comment, supra, at 556. See generally Uvegis v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948);
Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1965); People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489,
103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972).
82. See 422 U.S. at 835.
83. See People v. Freeman, 76 Cal. App. 3d 302, 142 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1978).
1165
Pacfc Law Journal / Vol 13
of understanding and intelligence. A defendant need not possess the
expertise of a lawyer, 4 but should be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, as well as the benefits of the assist-
ance of counsel.8 5 The discretion given to judges to determine a waiver
based on the particular facts and circumstances of each case 6 also car-
ries with it the responsibility to provide a proceeding that is consistent
with the values of an adversarial system.
7
The above-mentioned principles outline the basic federal approach
for determining a proper waiver. Nevada judicial activity in this area
has closely paralleled the federal developments.
C Nevada Right to Counsel
The Nevada Constitution provides that "the party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel ....
Much like the judicial interpretation given the sixth amendment, the
right to counsel in Nevada has not been extended to all criminal prose-
cutions. 9 Although Nevada statutory development of the right to
counsel has not kept pace with federal case law advancements, 90 the
actual practice parallels these federal developments.
In Garnick v. Miller,91 the Nevada Supreme Court appeared to ac-
cept the Von Moltke standard92 by adopting the specific requirements
therein.93 The Court, however, also stated that the right to counsel may
be waived if the waiver is knowingly and intelligently made, impliedly
adopting the more general standard.94 The general acceptance of the
standard that focused on whether the defendant comprehends the con-
sequences of the waiver, not measured by the detailed guidelines estab-
lished in Von Moltke, can explain any inconsistencies that exist in
Nevada case law. The widespread acceptance of the general Johnson
84. See Barnes v. State, 528 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Ark. 1975); 76 Cal. App. 3d at 307, 142 Cal.
Rptr. at 809.
85. See United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964).
86. 304 U.S. at 464.
87. See generally Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsek Argersinger and Beyond, 12 AM.
CRim. L. REv. 587, 612-16 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Duke].
88. NaV. CONST. art. I, §8.
89. See Nevada Revised Statutes Section 178.397 which states:
Every defendant accused of a gross misdemeanor or felony who is financially unable to
obtain counsel is entitled to have counsel assigned to represent him at every stage of the
proceedings from his initial appearance before a magistrate or through appeal, unless he
waives such appointment.
90. Nevada Revised Statutes Section 178.397 was last amended in 1967 without an allowance
for Argersinger.
91. 81 Nev. 372, 403 P.2d 850 (1965).
92. See notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
93. 81 Nev. at 372,403 P.2d at 850; see also Lawrence v. Warden, 84 Nev. 554, 555, 445 P.2d
156, 157 (1968).
94. See 81 Nev. at 376, 403 P.2d at 853.
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standard can suggest that Nevada has likewise adopted this more flex-
ible standard. This conclusion can be reached by examining recent Ne-
vada cases.
In McGeehan v. State,95 the Nevada Supreme Court stated that it
would not "blindly presume a knowing and intelligent waiver of a con-
stitutionaly protected right from a deficient record." 96 Additionally,
when presented with the issue of whether a person may refuse ap-
pointed counsel when facing a death sentence, the Nevada Supreme
Court cited Faretta and held that an accused has the right to self-repre-
sentation when it has been demonstrated that he voluntarily and intelli-
gently waived his right to counsel.9 7 Finally, the court has made the
observation that "the accused must be made aware of the danger and
disadvantages of self-representation and make his choice with his eyes
open."9 These decisions properly could be interpreted as adopting the
standard as generally accepted.
The Nevada Supreme Court additionally has sought to protect an
accused's right by imposing a duty on the trial judge to inquire into the
background and circumstances surrounding the case and thus, to deter-
mine whether the defendant truly understands the consequences of his
waiver.9 9 The court in Bundrant v. Fogliani'l° noted:
Though accused may tell the judge that he is informed of his right to
counsel and desires to waive his right, [the] judge's responsibility [to
determine whether intelligent waiver has been made] does not auto-
matically terminate.'01
In addition, this inquiry must appear in the record, 0 2 unsupported by
any affidavit.0 3
Although the Nevada Supreme Court has developed the right to
counsel consistent with federal standards, no case has been decided that
95. 95 Nev. 157, 591 P.2d 265 (1979).
96. Id. at 158, 591 P.2d at 266; see also Miller v. State, 86 Nev. 503, 505; 471 P.2d 213, 215
(1970); Bundrant v. Fogliani, 82 Nev. 388, 390, 419 P.2d 293, 294 (1966).
97. See Bishop v. State, 95 Nev. 511, 517, 597 P.2d 273, 276 (1979).
98. Hollis v. State, 95 Nev. 664, 665, 601 P.2d 62, 63 (1979).
99. See Reynolds v. Warden, 86 Nev. 941, 478 P.2d 574 (1970); Bundrant v. Fogliani, 82 Nev.
388, 419 P.2d 293 (1966).
100. 82 Nev. 388, 419 P.2d 293 (1966).
101. Id. at 389, 419 P.2d at 294.
102. See id. at 390, 419 P.2d at 294; Garnick v. Miller, 81 Nev. 372, 377, 403 P.2d 850, 853
(1965).
103. See McGeehan v. State, 95 Nev. 157, 591 P.2d 265 (1979); 81 Nev. at 377, 403 P.2d at 853.
The prosecution in Garnick suggested that the court record be supplemented by affidavits. The
Nevada Supreme Court rejected this claim and required the waiver appear from the court record.
Id. But Gf Miller v. State, 86 Nev. 503, 471 P.2d 213 (1970). In Miller the court stated that "the
record does not intimate that the defendant should not be allowed to decline counsel and repre-
sent himself." Id. at 506, 471 P.2d at 215. The unfortunate wording may suggest that a defendant
must prove a lack of a showing in the record instead of the state having the affirmative burden of
proof.
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pertains to the right to counsel- as it applies to misdemeanor prosecu-
tions. Because of the serious nature of a misdemeanor prosecution for
driving under the influence and the consequences of subsequent con-
victions, the likelihood of a challenge of any uncounseled conviction is
imminent. Whether the same record showing is required for misde-
meanor cases as is required for felony cases remains to be discussed.
104
Nevertheless, a general conclusion can be stated that some responsibil-
ity will remain with the trial judge to determine whether there has been
a valid waiver. This responsibility remains even though the nature of
the offense, being a relevant factual circumstance in determining a
waiver, may justify a lesser showing. A judge will still be required to
"investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances before him
demand." 105
The lack of decisions regarding the right to counsel for misdemeanor
prosecutions and the applicable standards of waiver hampers the abil-
ity of any lawyer to forecast the development of the right to counsel.
The Nevada courts must recognize the importance of developing stan-
dards for determining the validity of waivers at the misdemeanor court
level. Standards are helpful to courts reviewing a challenged waiver in
retrospect. 106 Equally important, standards are useful for developing
procedures that will ensure defendants have notice of their rights.10 7
Conversely, the lack of standards may explain the absence of proce-
dures that are used by misdemeanor courts for determining waivers of
the right to counsel.
The importance given the right to counsel, especially when loss of
liberty is involved, necessitates careful scrutiny of an alleged waiver.
The following sections will analyze present procedures followed by Ne-
vada misdemeanor courts and possible grounds for attack on prior un-
counseled convictions. These attacks may result in the inability of the
courts to impose imprisonment, particularly if proper procedures are
not implemented.
NEVADA CONVICTIONS AND ASSEMBLY-LINE JUSTICE
Misdemeanor courts are designed for speedy justice at the lowest cost
to the taxpayer. Considering the large number of petty offenses that
are disposed of daily, the system works effectively and efficiently. This
same system, however, has characteristics not suitable for disposition of
more serious crimes, for example drunk driving. An accused's right to
104. See notes 179-198 and accompanying text infra.
105. 86 Nev. at 944, 478 P.2d at 576.
106. See KRANTz, supra note 51, at 109.
107. See KRANTz, supra note 51, at 109.
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counsel may be overshadowed by the very nature of this system. In
misdemeanor trials the sheer volume of cases alone results in speedy
dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result. 108 The harsh reali-
ties of an overcrowded judicial system prompted one commentator to
state that a "[m]ere expansion of the right to counsel will not remedy
the problems of assembly-line justice;"' 10 9 however, counsel can help
guarantee a fair trial."' The problem in Nevada becomes one of
whether the integrity of the judicial system can be guaranteed by ensur-
ing that the accused is reliably provided counsel. The imminent possi-
bility of imprisonment faced by an uncounseled defendant accused of
driving under the influence is the most illustrative example of the ne-
cessity of providing for and guaranteeing the right to counsel. The mu-
nicipal court is the forum where an unjust result is apt to occur, and for
that reason, the procedures followed by the municipal courts will be
discussed to provide insight into the existing deficiencies.
The entire concern of this comment is with possible constitutional
challenges that may render a prior valid conviction void, which will
have the effect of denying the courts the power to impose imprisonment
as a possible sentence for a subsequent conviction."' For this reason,
many times the question will become a practical one of whether a valid
waiver can be shown, regardless of the fact that an accused's right was
scrupulously honored.
The procedures provided by legislative enactment or followed by
misdemeanor courts are designed for summary disposition of the cases.
For example, no trial record is provided at the municipal court level."
2
Likewise, although a record is provided at the justice court level,' '3 the
practical effect of entering a guilty plea is that no adequate record will
be kept to enable a reviewing court to determine independently the
existence of a valid waiver. The lack of a record alone may effectively
foreclose the ability to ascertain the fairness of the action taken by the
trial judge." 4 Furthermore, no provision exists that mandates uni-
formity of procedure between the various municipal courts.' 15 The ef-
fect of divergent procedures can lead one to suggest that in any given
108. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34-36 (1972).
109. See Froyd, IsArgersinger a Shot in the Arm or a Coup de Grace?, 62 A.B.A. J. 1154, 1155
(1976).
110. See 407 U.S. at 36-37.
111. See notes 131-134 and accompanying text infra.
112. Municipal courts are not courts of record as provided for in Nevada Revised Statutes
Section 1.020.
113. See N.R.S. §1.020.
114. Although the Nevada Supreme Court has required a record showing to determine the
existence of a valid waiver, no misdemeanor case has been decided either validating or invalidat-
ing the misdemeanor procedure.
115. See N.R.S. §5.075 (expressly allows variations in the official dockets between courts).
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case there may be reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was
properly informed of his right or apprised of the consequences of his
action.
Without established procedures, and in light of the absence of a rec-
ord, the question arises whether the validity of a conviction should be
presumed.116 If an alleged constitutional infringement is raised con-
cerning the conduct of the prior uncounseled conviction, the issue be-
comes whether Nevada's procedure permits a reasonable inference that
the accused waived his right to counsel. In focusing on the procedure
alone, if a reasonable inference cannot be drawn that the accused
waived his right to counsel, then that procedure should not be allowed
to continue.
1 17
A reviewing judge'1 8 has no means of ascertaining the validity of a
conviction imposed by a municipal court. Aside from the duty im-
posed by statute that requires the notification of the defendant's right to
counsel when arraigned,1 19 no provision mandates an affirmative duty
to inquire into the defendant's decision to waive his right to counsel. A
presumption that a defendant waived his right would arise only from
the mere fact of notification and absence of a request for counsel.
These two factors alone cannot justify a finding that there was a know-
ing and intelligent waiver. 2 These procedural deficiencies cannot be
cured by providing a trial de novo.
The two-tiered system provided by Nevada law12 ' gives the accused
the right to "appeal" a conviction to a district court and retry the case
on a clean slate. In effect, a defendant has two chances at acquittal.
The problem is whether a second trial, totally independent and unbi-
ased by the first trial, 22 will remedy a defective conviction even if
counsel is then provided, having been previously denied at the munici-
pal court.'
23
116. Generally, the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction is presumed valid. See Lloyd
v. State, 85 Nev. 576, 579, 460 P.2d 111, 113 (1969).
117. See Duke, u.upra note 87, at 625.
118. Within the context of this comment, a reviewing judge refers to either an appellate court,
or a subsequent lower court that must also view the validity of the uncounseled conviction, for the
purpose of enhancing the penalty.
119. See N.R.S. §171.188.
120. See Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513-17 (1962). See notes 48-87 and accompanying
text supra.
121. See Nevada Revised Statutes Section 266.565 which provides in part that "an appeal
perfected transfers the action to the district court for trial anew." Id.
122. The United States Supreme Court in Colton v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), held that
increasing the punishment at a second trial in a system of trial denovo did not violate due process
or double jeopardy. The Court determined that the trial courts are sufficiently independent and
that it was not reasonable to assume that the judges at the second trial would have any reason to
be vindictive against the accused for perfecting an appeal. 407 U.S. at 116-17.
123. See KRANTz, supra note 51, at 80. The commentator suggests that "a defendant. . . who
did not receive counsel at his original trial and who seeks review by way of a trial de novo, cannot
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There are possibilities that although the slate is clean the defendant
may be detrimentally harmed because he was unrepresented at the first
trial. Even though the second trial is heard in front of a different judge,
it remedies only one prejudice that may occur in a system of trial de
novo . 124 Because of the "smallness" of Nevada's judicial system, the
accused may have the same prosecutor at the second trial, or if not the
same, the prosecutor would be privy to details of the first prosecu-
tion.'2 5 This situation can result in a distinct advantage for the prose-
cution since it will have forewarning of the mistakes made and the
weaknesses of the defendant's case."2 6 These advantages could have a
detrimental effect at the trial de novo.
A close analogy exists between requiring counsel at a preliminary
hearing'27 and also at the first trial in a trial de novo system. The im-
portance of counsel at a preliminary hearing can be instrumental in
protecting the constitutional rights of the accused and additionally "[in
obtaining] the incidental opportunity for discovery to aid in preparing
the trial. Both these needs exist in the first step of a trial de novo, as
well."' 28 Thus, if the proposition is accepted that counsel is required
for the first trial even though a trial de novo is provided, there would be
a sentencing restriction 29 if counsel were not provided at the first step
of the two-tiered system.
Although those uncounseled convictions that do not result in a sen-
tence of imprisonment are valid, the existence of a recidivist statute'30
compounds the problem. The discussion will now shift to the collateral
use of these uncounseled convictions and whether they can be used to
impose imprisonment for subsequent convictions under a recidivist
statute.
BALDASAR AND BEYOND
In Baldasar v. Illinois,' the United States Supreme Court was
presented with the issue of whether an uncounseled conviction "may be
used under an enhancement penalty statute to convert a subsequent
receive a sentence of imprisonment as a result of the trial de novo." See KRANTZ, supra note 51,
at 80.
124. See 407 U.S. at 116-17.
125. With small prosecution offices it is easy for the prosecutors to exchange case notes so that
even with different prosecutors they will still know witnesses that are expected to be called, what
their testimony was, and what arguments the defense used at the first trial.
126. See KRANTZ, supra note 51, at 81-82.
127. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970).
128. See KRANTZ, supra note 51, at 82.
129. See notes 135-159 and accompanying text infra.
130. A recidivist statute is one that punishes a person who is a criminal repeater either for the
same act or criminal acts in general.
131. 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
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misdemeanor into a felony with a prison term." 132 The Court deter-
mined that an uncounseled conviction is invalid for the purpose of im-
posing imprisonment and remains invalid for a subsequent
conviction.133 The clear result of Argersinger, Scott, and Baldasar is
that imprisonment cannot be imposed when the uncounseled convic-
tion arises from an ineffective waiver and, furthermore, that conviction
cannot be used to imprison under an enhancement statute.1 34 The
mandatory sentence of imprisonment for a second conviction of a vio-
lation of the DUI statute will require a determination by the trial judge
of whether the defendant waived his right to counsel at the time of the
first trial. Succeeding sections will discuss special problems that relate
to entries of pleas, and enhancing the penalties for convictions from
other jurisdictions and for convictions prior to the enactment date of
the new DUI statute.
A. Measuring Valid Waivers
While first convictions are constitutionally valid because imprison-
ment is not imposed, this does not mean they are valid for all purposes.
Permitting a state the opportunity to imprison for a subsequent viola-
tion will indirectly allow what the previous conviction could not
achieve alone. The mandatory sentence of imprisonment under the
DUI statute would not have been authorized but for the previous con-
viction, and thus the desired punishment is a direct consequence of the
uncounseled dbnviction. 135 To invoke the desired punishment, the state
must, therefore, validate the uncounseled conviction by showing a
waiver of the right to counsel.
The facts and circumstances of each case will determine whether the
defendant waived his right to counsel. 136 Furthermore, the character of
the defendant's decision to proceedpro se will control-not the specific
procedures that are followed. 137 The procedure followed by the courts,
however, will be an element of the factual circumstances. 3 In this
manner, the absence of documented evidence of waiver and the uncer-
tainty of what transpired at the previous trial must be considered when
it is determined whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to counsel.
The issue of the sufficiency of the waiver will arise when the defend-
132. Id. at 222.
133. Id. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 226.
135. See id. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
136. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
137. See KRANTZ, supra note 51, at 109.
138. See KRANrz, supra note 51, at 109.
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ant affirmatively alleges that he was not informed of his right or that he
did not understand the consequences of his action. A presumption that
a conviction is valid' 9 would necessitate such an affirmative allegation,
however, the problem then faced by the state is rebutting that allega-
tion. The standard used in felony cases is that a presumption of waiver
cannot be found from a silent record.'40 Thus, the state has the burden
of showing there was a valid waiver.'
4'
The nature of misdemeanor courts in Nevada does not suggest that
defendants are actually denied representation without a proper waiver,
but, that the methods used indicate that the state is limited in its ability
to rebut an alleged constitutional infirmity. The most important means
by which the state could effectively rebut these allegations would be
with a court record. The court record can be illustrative of the extent of
the notification of the defendant's rights, the degree to which the de-
fendant understands his action measured by the conduct and responses
of the defendant, and, more importantly, the basis on which the trial
judge made his determination. Without a record a reviewing court can
only assume what should have occurred. The clear weight of authority
is that this assumption is invalid when unsupported affirmatively in the
record.'42 The judicial system should not maintain procedures that fail
to support a reasonable inference of an informed intelligent waiver.
143
The nature of misdemeanor courts on a nationwide basis also leads
to the conclusion that strict procedures should be used to ensure ade-
quate representation to preserve fairness. The pressures of time and
resources of misdemeanor courts lessen the logic of accepting the pre-
sumed validity of an uncounseled conviction.'44 One commentator has
suggested that a trial judge in a misdemeanor case is more likely to
disregard the defendant's interest because of these pressures and also
because there is "far less reason for a judge to anticipate that his deci-
sion will be reviewed."' 141 This indifference can no longer be the rule,
139. "Every presumption is indulged in favor of the validity of a judgment of a court of gen-
eral jurisdiction." Lloyd v. State, 85 Nev. 576, 579, 460 P.2d 11, 113 (1969).
140. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962); United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d
182, 186 (9th Cir. 1973); Garnick v. Miller, 81 Nev. 372, 403 P.2d 850 (1965).
141. The California courts have adopted a procedure for testing the sufficiency of an alleged
constitutional infringement of a prior conviction. See People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 204, 217, 430
P.2d 15, 24, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457, 466 (1967). The defendant must first produce evidence tending to
show there was not a valid waiver. Id. The courts, however, have found the burden to be met
merely from the defendant's own testimony. See People v. McFarland, 108 Cal. App. 3d 211, 221,
166 Cal. Rptr. 429, 435 (1980). After the defendant has met his burden the state then has the
burden of rebuttal which cannot be met with a silent record. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 242 (1969); In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 132, 460 P.2d 449, 456, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 584 (1969).
142. See 369 U.S. at 516; 486 F.2d at 186; 81 Nev. at 377, 403 P.2d at 853.
143. See Duke, supra note 87, at 625.
144. See Duke, supra note 87, at 625.
145. See Duke, supra note 87, at 625.
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especially when imprisonment is sought to be a deterrent to driving
under the influence. The consequences of previously unimportant con-
victions can now result in imprisonment. The rule expressed in
Baldasar and the purpose behind Argersinger mandate judicial aware-
ness of the significance of the right to counsel for misdemeants who are
likely to be imprisoned. Counsel is also important for those persons
who choose to plead guilty or nolo contendere.
B. Uncounseled Pleas
An uncounseled plea of guilty does not necessarily constitute a
waiver of counsel; 146 however, under limited circumstances, it may be
so construed. 47 The determination whether a defendant waived his
right to counsel when he attempted to enter an uncounseled plea has
been held to depend on the same considerations that are required for a
determination of whether he waived his other sixth amendment
rights. 148 The same standard, therefore, must be imposed on the state
to show affirmatively that the uncounseled plea was entered intelli-
gently and voluntarily.
1 49
The acceptance of an uncounseled guilty plea is likely to be accepted
more readily without regard to the nature of the waiver because such
an admission of guilt may be inherently more reliable than ordinary
convictions. This reliability also suggests the importance of providing
a fair hearing. The obvious ramifications of an admission led one court
to state that a plea "cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant
possesses an understanding of the law in relation to thefacts."'150 An
understanding of the law goes beyond a mere determination of guilt or
innocence.
The benefit of counsel could guarantee that all relevant factors are
considered by the court because of the existence of "substantial reasons
which justified or mitigated the violations" 51 and, which would not be
within the understanding of a layperson. As Justice Douglas recog-
146. See Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
147. See Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 177-80 (1946). The defendant was informed of conse-
quences after requesting to enter a plea. Admittedly, nothing was presented tending to bear on the
intelligence of his action, as the court stated, "[w]e have only the fact that the trial judge explained
what the plea of guilty involved." Id. at 178.
Serious questions should be raised whether this record should be sufficient to determine the
existence of a knowing and intelligent waiver. The record cannot be said to reflect that the de-
fendant understood his rights or the consequences of waiving them. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369
U.S. 506, 513-17 (1962); United States v. Washington, 341 F.2d 277, 284 (3d Cir. 1965).
148. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
149. See id. at 242, 244; McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464 (1969).
150. 394 U.S. at 466.
151. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
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nized, 152 counsel should be provided to protect the accused from an
overzealous prosecutor, the complexity of the law, or even his own be-
wilderment and ignorance of a system that now threatens the depriva-
tion of his liberty.'53
A capsule argument may be helpful to an understanding of the
problems faced by Nevada in attempting to enforce the mandatory im-
prisonment provision in the DUI statute. The triggering device for the
attachment of the right to counsel is the imposition of imprisonment. 1
5 4
The holding in Baldasar requires every trial that contributes to the im-
position of imprisonment under an enhancement statute to likewise re-
sult from a valid conviction, i.e., the defendant must waive his right.
155
The ruling in Baldasar, therefore, necessitates a determination of
waiver at every trial for a violation of driving under the influence. The
underlying basis, as provided in Argersinger is that "absent a knowing
and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense
... unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.
156
Thus far, the discussion of what is waiver has centered on whether
the defendant has understood or appreciated the consequences of
proceedingpro se.157 Of equal importance, also embodied in the re-
quirements for a waiver, is the notion of what information need be pro-
vided the defendant so he can make a knowledgeable decision. The
informational process goes beyond the mere recitation of a defendant's
rights"'58 because each defendant also must be made aware of all "facts
essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter."' 59 Enhance-
ment statutes raise the unique question of whether a defendant must be
apprised of the possibilities of enhancement for subsequent
convictions.
C. Notice of Possibility of Enhancement
A prior conviction cannot be used to enhance the penalty if it is ob-
tained in violation of the accused's constitutional rights.'60 Thus, the
implication is that a valid constitutional conviction can be used for the
purpose of enhancement. Because misdemeanors do not trigger the
152. 329 U.S. at 181 (quoting from Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 476 (1945)).
153. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
154. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372 (1979).
155. See Baldasar v. Illinois, 546 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
156. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
157. See notes 56-88 and accompanying text supra.
158. See N.R.S. §171.188.
159. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948).
160. See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
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right to counsel until imprisonment is to be imposed,161 a special con-
cern is present. Although a prior misdemeanor conviction is valid be-
cause it did not result in imprisonment, it is invalid for the collateral
purpose of enhancing the penalty so imprisonment can be imposed.162
If it is assumed that a first conviction is valid per Scott requirements
then the validity of that conviction should be judged frozen in time and
not modified by subsequent conduct. The inquiry must, therefore, fo-
cus on whether notice of the possibility of future imprisonment is nec-
essary for the defendant to appreciate the consequences of his action.
In other words, is this information necessary to validate the first
conviction?
A recent New York court, 61 when presented with the situation in
which a defendant was not imprisoned for the first offense and was not
told of the possibilities of future imprisonment for subsequent conduct,
ruled there was not a valid waiver."6 The court stated that without
information pertaining to the possibility of imprisonment for future
convictions, there could not be a knowing relinquishment of the de-
fendant's rights. 16  The court expressly relied on Baldasar.
66
Baldasar holds only that the first conviction cannot be used to im-
pose imprisonment if it resulted from a conviction in which imprison-
ment was not a possible punishment because of a denial of the
defendant's right to counsel. 16 7 Baldasar is not a case that establishes
the standard to be used in determining a valid waiver for the first con-
viction. The New York court's reliance on Baldasar may indicate that
there was not otherwise a valid waiver, rather than whether the infor-
mation was necessary for a valid waiver.
Justice Powell, dissenting in Baldasar, argued that the sentence im-
posed on the defendant was solely a penalty for the second theft.'
68
Justice Powell attempted to use this argument as a basis for his claim
that a valid conviction, because it did not result in imprisonment, is
valid for all purposes, including enhancement of the penalty so as to
imprison.' 69 Although Justice Powell was in the minority, the logic of
his classification of the punishment is based on accepted views of habit-
161. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37
(1972).
162. See 446 U.S. at 222-23.
163. People v. Sirianni, 109 Misc. 2d 781, 440 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Co. Ct. 1981).
164. See id. at -, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
165. See id. -, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
166. See id., 440 N.Y.S.2d at 990. (citing Baldasar v. Illinois 446 U.S. 222 (1980)).
167. 446 U.S. at 222-24.
168. See id. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting).
169. See id. at 232-33.
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ual criminal statutes. 170
Habitual criminal statutes have been construed to penalize only the
last offense committed, 171 unrelated to any previous convictions, and
have been held valid.172 Habitual criminality is considered a status
rather than a crime in itself.173 This simply means that a person is pun-
ished for a behavior of repeated criminality. The only concern is the
fact of multiple offenses, and in this sense notification of the possibility
of future imprisonment will not make the waivers more reliable. The
courts simply require that those prior convictions be valid in their own
right. Future conduct should, therefore, be irrelevant at the time the
consequences of the first conviction are contemplated.
If Nevada were to adopt the standard used by the New York court,
all convictions for driving under the influence that occurred before the
enactment date of July 1, 1981, and those convictions that resulted
from trial in other jurisdictions, could not be used for enhancement.
The rationale of the New York case is that no intelligent waiver can
result unless the defendant has been apprised of the possibilities for
enhancement; therefore, it could never be said that a defendant was
aware that an Indiana conviction, for example, could result in impris-
onment in Nevada for a subsequent offense of driving under the influ-
ence. This result would not coincide with established judicial doctrine
that allows for the use of convictions from other jurisdictions.174 Addi-
tionally, out-of-state felony convictions could be used under a recidivist
statute, yet, under the reasoning of the New York decision misde-
meanor convictions could not.
175
The general acceptance of habitual criminal statutes suggests that a
170. See id. at 232.
171. See Oyler v. Bolen, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962); Moore v. Missouri, 139 U.S. 673, 677
(1895).
172. Generally habitual offenders statutes are valid and held not to abridge constitutional
rights if they are applied fairly and without discrimination. See 368 U.S. at 454-57.
An issue may be raised about the possible discriminatory effect of the Nevada statute because
the state may not have any practical means of determining prior convictions from other jurisdic-
tions. Enforcement of the statute would discriminate against persons convicted in Nevada. A
similar issue was raised in Oyler where all possible repeat offenders were not prosecuted equally.
Id. The court stated: "the allegations set out no more than a failure to prosecute others because
of a lack of knowledge of their prior offenses. This does not deny equal protection due petitioners
under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 456. The Court further stated that selectivity in en-
forcement is not in itself violative of equal protection, unless "the selection was deliberately based
upon an unjustified standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification." Id.
173. See People v. Dunlap, 102 Cal. App. 2d 314, 316; 227 .2d 281, 283 (1951).
174. See Ex Parte Wolfson, 30 Cal. 2d 20, 31-33, 180 P.2d 326, 333-34 (1947) (upholding
statute that allows use of convictions from other jurisdictions).
175. See Hartman v. Municipal Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 891, 893, 111 Cal. Rptr. 126, 127
(1973). The court determined that at the time of the entry of plea, the defendant was adequately
advised of penalties for the frst conviction. To advise of consequences for second conviction
would have been premature. Id.; see also People v. Andrews, 170 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 840, 841-42,
339 P.2d 648, 649 (1959). The first conviction occurred before the enactment of the new law.
Mandating jail sentence for the second offense did not increase the penalty for the first violation,I
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valid conviction, even if imprisonment is not imposed because there
was a valid waiver, should likewise be valid for the purpose of en-
hancement. If this standard is used, then the concern of Baldasar, that
a conviction should not do indirectly what it could not do directly, 176
would not be violated. The validity of waivers at the first trial should
not be dictated by what hypothetically might occur in the future.
The seriousness attached to a violation of drunk driving will necessi-
tate an evaluation of waivers at prior trials and, consequently, an eval-
uation of the entire scope of the right to counsel as it applies to
misdemeants. The following section will outline some suggestions that
will alleviate the problems faced by prosecutors.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL: PROPOSED STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES
The inability of Nevada courts to show whether a defendant waived
the right to counsel at a misdemeanor hearing must be addressed either
through judicial determination or legislative mandate. If Nevada
desires to implement the strict terms of its drunk driving statute and
impose mandatory sentences of imprisonment and felony penalties for
repeat offenders, the courts must develop procedures that will not vio-
late the sixth amendment and will facilitate the process of ensuring
valid convictions. Facilitating valid waivers will not result in more reli-
able convictions, but will protect those successful uncounseled convic-
tions that are obtained.
The prohibitions against involuntary or unintelligent pleas (or waiv-
ers) should not be relaxed, but neither should an exercise in arid
logic render those constitutional guarantees counter-productive and
put in jeopardy the very human values they were meant to
preserve. 1
77
The next section will recommend standards that should be used for
measuring valid waivers, followed by a discussion of present proposals.
The ultimate purpose is to suggest procedures that, if followed, would
help guarantee the validity of prior convictions for the purpose of im-
posing imprisonment under the DUI statute.
A. Recommendations
The Supreme Court decisions in Scott and Baldasar are clear in their
requirements and intent. 7 ' But a determination that rights exist does
but merely established a more severe penalty for the second conviction. Id. at 842, 339 P.2d at
649.
176. 446 U.S. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
177. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970).
178. See notes 40-44 and 131-134 and accompanying text supra.
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not conclude a court's responsibility. The Nevada courts must struggle
with unanswered questions relating to the right to counsel for mis-
demeants, namely: what standard should be used in determining the
existence of a waiver, and what procedures need to be adopted to en-
sure the sixth amendment is not violated?
1. Waiver Standard
The United States Supreme Court has not passed on the legitimacy
of less formal methods of determining a waiver for misdemeanor
cases.179 Nevertheless, the Nevada courts need not await federal gui-
dance to establish whether the same record showing required for felony
cases is also required for misdemeanor offenses.
In United States v. Dujanovic, s° the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
established as a minimum requirement that the district court may not
grant a request of waiver without first addressing the accused person-
ally and determining on the record whether counsel was waived.18' The
California Supreme Court, however, in In re Johnson 82 held that for
misdemeanor cases the oral examination is not needed to show an af-
firmative waiver in the record.'8 3 The court in Johnson viewed these
inquiries as an "idle and time-wasting ritual."' 84  The California
Supreme Court and some commentators have instead granted judicial
convenience considerable weight when declaring necessary
standards.1
8 5
Because Johnson is a pre-Argersinger decision the importance of the
case may be lessened. The Argersinger decision implies that the stan-
dard for determining waivers for misdemeanors should be the same as
in felony cases. 186 The Court has not recognized a lesser right, only a
lower threshold for when the right attaches.18 7 This awareness was an
application of established standards for measuring waivers in felony
cases. 188
The constitutional right to be provided counsel in the Argersinger
situation is merely an extension of the same Sixth Amendment man-
179. See Duke, supra note 87, at 624.
180. 486 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1973).
181. See id. at 186.
182. 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1965).
183. Id. at 336, 398 P.2d at 427, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
184. Id. at 336, 398 P.2d at 427, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
185. See id. at 336, 398 P.2d at 427, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 235; see also Duke, supra note 87, at 624.
But see Herman & Thompson, supra note 36, at 106.
186. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972). The Supreme Court stated "that absent a
knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified
as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." Id.
187. See id.
188. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1969).
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date previously applied to felony prosecutions by Gideon v. Wain-
wright. The constitutional requirements for a valid waiver are
therefore the same.' 89
Although the state has a fiscal interest in minimizing the administra-
tive burdens of its judicial system, 190 the state also has an obligation to
provide a fair system for the adjudication of claims. One rationale de-
rived from Argersinger, Scott, and Baldasar is that imprisonment, re-
gardless of the term, is not de minimis.'9' In addition to resulting in
imprisonment, misdemeanor convictions can have serious collateral
consequences.
Misdemeanor convictions can justify revocation of parole, 192 proba-
tion, 1 93 or a suspended sentence. Furthermore, they can be used in the
impeachment of the defendant's testimony and create social and eco-
nomic stigma that can result from a conviction for drunken driving.
The right to counsel has been described as essential to fairness in the
American criminal system, 194 yet acceptance of these basic civil liber-
ties has not been quick. 195 The dichotomy produced by Scott' out-
come-determinative test is but one example of this slow
development. 96 "Scots holding implicitly assumes a fair trial is only
important when imprisonment results."' 197 Because imprisonment will
directly result from a second conviction, the impact of the importance
of counsel to a fair trial must be realized, if not the notion that counsel
is essential for all misdemeanor trials. The inescapable sentence of im-
prisonment for two or more violations of the DUI statute suggests the
imposition of similar standards for misdemeanor cases.
The use of a similar standard will not impose identical burdens on a
trial judge because that standard expresses the notion that a waiver will
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 198 The circum-
stances may not necessitate a lengthy colloquy by the court with the
defendant or require a full court record. All that is required is suffi-
cient recorded evidence that the defendant voluntarily, and with under-
standing and intelligence, waived his right to counsel. Once this
standard is adopted, it can be used to develop procedures for notifying
defendants of their rights.
189. KrtAN.z, supra note 51, at 106.
190. See Herman & Thompson, supra note 36, at 104-07.
191. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 372, 372-73; 407 U.S. at 41 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
192. See N.R.S. §§213.150-213.1519.
193. See N.R.S. §176.185.
194. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
195. See notes 17-23 and accompanying text supra.
196. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
197. 48 U. CN. L. Rnv. 922, 926 (1979).
198. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937).
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2 Necessary Procedures
The importance of proper procedures cannot be over emphasized.
Use of proper procedure can "eliminate wasteful appellate adjudica-
tion as well as safeguard the rights of the accused." '99 The goal of
setting out procedures should be to provide the maximum protection
for the defendant without a concern about whether the procedure is
constitutionally required.200 The process of ensuring that the defend-
ant has sufficient knowledge of his rights and that he is apprised of the
reasonable consequences of his action can be satisfied best by requiring
the trial judge to read a checklist of information. This information
should include, but not be limited to:
1. a plain statement of the nature of the charge;
2. all statutorily included lesser offenses;
3. the possible range of allowable punishment;
4. all allowable defenses, including what the prosecution is re-
quired to prove;
5. any mitigating circumstances the facts may indicate; and,
6. in the interest of providing "all facts essential to a broad under-
standing of the whole matter," 20 1 the accused should be advised
of the possibilities of enhancement or other collateral
consequences.20 2
Once a procedure is adopted that ensures an adequate level of notifi-
cation, the trial court must consider what steps should be taken for the
waiver to meet the substantive standard.0 3 One element that should be
used is an open colloquy with the defendant. In-court examinations
will aid in the determination of whether there is a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver. A simple recitation of the defendant's right and a mere
request to proceedpro se is not an indication that the defendant knows
what he is doing or that he appreciates the consequences of his action.
Many defendants can be subjected to subtle intimidation or base their
waiver on thoughtless rationalizations. This can be true in the case of
an uncounseled trial or with the entry of a plea. The judge should
inquire into the educational background of the accused, as well as any
relevant experiences, and note the conduct* of the accused during the
examination.2°4 Additionaly, the judge must ascertain whether the ac-
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948).
202. Although the accused should be advised of the possibilities of enhancement, the Nevada
courts should not reverse if this information is not given. If a rule of reversal is adopted it would
foreclose the use of convictions from any other jurisdiction and those convictions prior to July 1,
1981. See notes 160-176 and accompanyin text supra.
203. See notes 178-198 and accompanying text supra.
204. See Reynolds v. Warden, 86 Nev. 941, 478 P.2d 574 (1970).
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cused has been threatened or promised anything in return for the un-
counseled appearance or plea and must emphasize the possibilities that
a lawyer could discover the existence of defenses or mitigating circum-
stances not apparent to the layperson. °5 Only after this investigation,
and to the judge's satisfaction that there is a knowing and intelligent
waiver, should the waiver or plea be accepted.
The final problem to be addressed is how the state can affirmatively
show this valid waiver. The best method would be to require a court
record be kept for this class of cases. The obvious costs involved would
not justify the imposition of these measures if less formal but suffi-
ciently reliable alternatives were available. The prohibitive cost in-
volved with court records could have the effect of forcing the courts to
forego the possibility of imprisonment.
At a minimum, the trial judge should be required to file in the official
docket, along with the final judgment, a document which explains:
1. the procedure followed;
2. the information provided the accused; and
3. a brief summary of the investigation by the judge, including
questions asked and the accused's responses.
The ultimate concern should be to guard against conclusory statements
and stilted formal conversation.20 6 This document, which would be-
come part of the official record, would provide a reviewing court the
opportunity to ascertain independently the existence or nonexistence of
a valid waiver and, as such, facilitate the successful use of the prior
conviction.
One problem that has been hinted at, but not explored, pertains to
the method of implementing the procedures set out above. At a mini-
mum, counsel must be extended to all defendants accused of violating
the DUI statute or a similar offense that may result in imprisonment
either directly or indirectly. A more desirable method, however, may
be to offer the assistance of counsel to all defendants who are charged
with an offense for which there is the potential of imprisonment °.2 7 As
noted, the procedures as set out above may not be mandated constitu-
tionally, yet they are proposed as, an attempt to ensure the maximum
protection of defendants' rights. For this reason, one current proposal
suggested by the Washoe County District Attorney's Office 20 should
205. See State v. Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486, 494, 126 N.W.2d 91, 95-96 (1964).
206. See Smith v. United States, 238 F.2d 925, 930-31 (5th Cir. 1956). The accused executed a
formal written waiver which contained no definitive statement of his right to counsel. The court
had brief formal conversation with the accused and gave only dilatic observations that he could be
sent to prison for a long time. Id.
207. See KRANTZ, supra note 51, at 104.
208. See Appendix infra.
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be analyzed in light of the standards set out above.
B. Present Proposals
The Washoe County District Attorney's proposed waiver form is a
well-intended document attempting to cope with the problem of defi-
cient records and procedures at misdemeanor courts. The form, how-
ever, has basic deficiencies. Initially, the form by its title--"WAVER
ON PLEA OF GUILTY/NO CONTEST"-ignores any problems that arise
when a defendant asserts the right of self-representation at a trial.20 9
The assumption must be drawn that either no defendant will proceed
pro se when faced with a drunk driving charge or that there are no
deficiencies in convictions that result from a misdemeanor trial. Both
are false.210 The form also appears to be based on the assumption that
signing the form alone, without some meaningful inquiry, is of itself
sufficient to support a finding that there was a knowing and intelligent
waiver. The length and complexity of the form would suggest a con-
trary result.211
The form may be an effective tool in informing the accused of the
charges against him and the allowable punishments under the law;
however, it is difficult to accept after reading this lengthy form and
merely checking a box, that a reviewing court could conclude the ac-
cused offered his plea "freely and voluntarily understanding the nature
of the charge against [him] and this waiver."2 12 These conclusionary
statements, without some other indication, should not satisfy the re-
quirements of a valid waiver. The right to counsel as protected by this
form will result in a superficial right because the protections are not
meaningful.
Use of this form may result in more of an indication of a waiver than
is present today; however, a reasonable presumption of an understand-
ing waiver is not promulgated. Furthermore, a judge's responsibility
should extend past handing the form to the accused and simply signing
his own statement about the "voluntariness" of the plea or waiver.
Without mandating some uniform process of discussion between the
judge and the defendant, a reviewing court would be faced with the
same dilemmas posed by the current system. The absence of this collo-
quy results in only one conclusion-the judge's determination is based
209. Most of the uncounseled problems probably will arise in situations surrounding a plea;
however, the possibilities of uncounseled waivers at a trial are too real to be ignored.
210. One who wishes to proceedpro se when facing the death penalty will not be less likely to
proceedpro se when facing ten days imprisonment. See Bishop v. State, 95 Nev. 511, 597 P.2d
273 (1979).
211. See Appendix infra.
212. See Appendix paragraph 11 infra (emphasis added).
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solely on the completion of the form. A right to counsel consistent with
the seriousness of the crime involved requires a more rigid standard.
Fairness dictates nothing less.
CONCLUSION
This comment has illustrated the methods currently being used by
the Nevada courts to determine waivers at misdemeanor trials. The
methods are deficient in that no record, or affirmative indication, is
kept that evidences a defendant's knowing and intelligent waiver. This
deficiency prevents a reviewing judge from ascertaining independently
the existence of the waiver.
This comment has illustrated the importance of the ability of the re-
viewing judge to ascertain whether the defendant knowingly and intel-
ligently waived the right to counsel. Without this determination the
prior conviction cannot be used to enhance the penalty that will now
result in imprisonment. Uncoiinseled pleas of guilty and nolo con-
tendere are of equal importance. Additionally, this comment has dis-
cussed the special problems concerning notifications of the possibility
of enhancement at the time of the first trial and why this notification
should not be essential to a knowing and intelligent waiver. Finally,
procedures and standards have been proposed that will ensure that the
defendant's rights are safeguarded and that will foreclose the possibili-
ties of collateral attack.
Nothing can be done to permanently rid the judicial system of collat-
eral attacks. The goal can only be to find a practical means to facilitate
an orderly and reliable presentation of evidence to aid the truth-finding
process. Viewing the problems of this relatively simply constructed
statute can lead to the adoption of procedures that will ensure the pres-
entation of helpful evidence while safeguarding the rights guaranteed
under the United States and Nevada constitutions.
Brian T Kunzi
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APPENDIX
WAIVER ON PLEA OF GUILTY/NO CONTEST
1 - DEFENDANT: My full true name is __
Date of birth: __
2a- I understand that I am charged with the following offense: El
Driving or Being in Actual Physical Control of a Motor Vehi-
cle While Under the Influence of Intoxicants, a violation of
NRS 484.379.
b- I have*/have not previously been convicted of this offense in El
this or another jurisdiction.
*explain dates and jurisdiction of priors:
3a- I understand that if a jail sentence is to be imposed upon con- El
viction, I am entitled to be represented by an attorney before,
during, and after trial, and if I cannot afford an attorney the
Court will appoint one to defend me.
b- I am represented by an attorney. El
or
c- I waive and give up the right to have a lawyer represent me El
and I exercise my right to represent myself.
4a- I understand that I have a constitutional right to a speedy and El
public trial by jury or by the court (judge).
b- It is my desire to enter a guilty plea/plea of no contest and I El
give up the right to a trial by jury and a trial by the court
(judge).
5a- I understand that I have the right to confront the witnesses El
against me and to cross-examine them either -by myself or
through my lawyer.
b- It is my desire to enter a guilty plea/plea of no contest, and I El
give up the right to confront the witnesses against me and to
cross-examine them.
6a- I understand that I have the right to testify on my own behalf, El
but I cannot be compelled to be a witness against myself. I
may remain silent if I so choose.
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b- I desire to enter a guilty plea/plea of no contest, and I give up 0l
the right not to testify and the right to remain silent.
7a- I understand that the penalties provided upon a first convic- El
tion for this offense are:
1) a mandatory fine of not less than $100.00 and no more 0l
than $1,000.00; and
2) a possible jail sentence of not more than six months; and El
3) my mandatory attendance at an alcohol/substance abuse El
course approved by the Department of Motor Vehicles, at
my own expense; and
4) a possible suspension of my driver's license from thirty El
days to one year.
b- I understand that the penalties provided upon a second con-
viction in any jurisdiction within five years for this offense
are:
1) a mandatory fine of not less than $500.00 and not more El
than $1,000.00; and
2) a mandatory jail sentence of ten days to six months. Pro- El
bation is not available; and
3) mandatory suspension of my driver's license for not less El
than six months.
c- I understand that if I have two or more prior convictions in El
any jurisdiction for this offense within five years, the penalties
are:
1) a mandatory prison sentence of not less than one year and El
not more than six years. Probation is not available; and
2) a mandatory fine of not less than $2,000.00 and no more El
than $3,000.00; and
3) mandatory revocation of my driver's license for one year. El
8 - I understand that as an alternative to the above penalties I El
may elect only once in a five year period to undergo alcohol-
ism/drug abuse treatment, approved by the Court, for at least
one year, under terms and conditions set forth by the court.
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9 - I understand that if I am not a citizen of the United States, a El
conviction of the offense for which I have been charged may
have consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission
to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to
the laws of the United States.
10 - I understand that the elements of this offense, which the State 0
would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial are:
That on the date alleged in the complaint against El
me, in the County of Washoe, State of Nevada, I
willfully and unlawfully did operate/was in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while being
under the influence of intoxicants.
11 - I offer my plea of (guilty) (no contest) freely and voluntarily, 0
understanding the nature of the charge against me and this
waiver.
12 - I have personally initialed each of the above boxes and I El
understand each and every one of the rights above and I
hereby waive and give up each of them as I have indicated in




13 - DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY ONLY: I am attorney of record
and I have explained each of the above rights to the defendant,
and having explored the facts with him/her, studied his/her pos-
sible defenses to the charge and the possible consequences of a
plea of (guilty) (no contest). I further stipulate that this document
may be received by the Court as evidence of the defendant's intel-
ligent waiver of these rights and that it shall be filed by the Clerk
as a permanent record to that waiver. I have witnessed the read-
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ORDER
I find in open court that the defendant has been fully advised of his/her
constitutional rights and understands them, the nature of the charge
and the consequences of his/her plea. Further, I find the defendant
understandingly and voluntarily pleads guilty or nolo contendere and
waives his/her constitutional rights. IT IS ORDERED that the de-
fendant's plea. be accepted and entered into the minutes of the court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following sentence be imposed:
Dated:
Judge of the Justice Court
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